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1. INTRODUCTION
I am honored and grateful to have so many in-
teresting and challenging comments on my paper. I
want to thank the discussants for their willingness to
jump back into the thorny quagmire of Birnbaum’s
argument. To a question raised in the paper “Does
it matter?”, these discussions show the answer is
yes. The enlightening connections to contemporary
projects are especially valuable in galvanizing future
efforts to address foundational issues in statistics.
As long-standing as Birnbaum’s result has been,
Birnbaum himself went through dramatic shifts in
a short period of time following his famous (1962)
result. More than of historical interest, these shifts
provide a unique perspective on the current prob-
lem. Already in the rejoinder to Birnbaum (1962),
he is worried about criticisms (by Pratt (1962)) per-
taining to applying WCP to his constructed math-
ematical mixtures (what I call Birnbaumization),
and hints at replacing WCP with another princi-
ple (Irrelevant Censoring). Then there is a gap un-
til around 1968 at which point Birnbaum declares
the SLP plausible “only in the simplest case, where
the parameter space has but two” predesignated
points [Birnbaum (1968), page 301]. He tells us in
Birnbaum (1970a, page 1033) that he has pursued
the matter thoroughly, leading to “rejection of both
the likelihood concept and various proposed formal-
izations of prior information.” The basis for this
shift is that the SLP permits interpretations that
“can be seriously misleading with high probability”
[Birnbaum (1968), page 301]. He puts forward the
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“confidence concept” (Conf) which takes from the
Neyman–Pearson (N–P) approach “techniques for
systematically appraising and bounding the prob-
abilities (under respective hypotheses) of seriously
misleading interpretations of data” while supplying
it an evidential interpretation [Birnbaum (1970a),
page 1033]. Given the many different associations
with “confidence,” I use (Conf) in this Rejoinder to
refer to Birnbaum’s idea. Many of the ingenious ex-
amples of the incompatibilities of SLP and (Conf)
are traceable back to Birnbaum, optional stopping
being just one [see Birnbaum (1969)]. A bibliogra-
phy of Birnbaum’s work is Giere (1977). Before his
untimely death (at 53), Birnbaum denies the SLP
even counts as a principle of evidence (in Birnbaum
(1977)). He thought it anomalous that (Conf) lacked
an explicit evidential interpretation, even though, at
an intuitive level, he saw it as the “one rock in a
shifting scene” in statistical thinking and practice
[Birnbaum (1970a), page 1033]. I return to this in
Section 4 of this rejoinder.
2. BJØRNSTAD, DAWID AND EVANS
Let me begin by answering the central criticisms
that, if correct, would be obstacles to what I purport
to have shown in my paper. It is entirely understand-
able that leading voices in a long-lived controversy
would assume that all of the twists and turns, av-
enues and roadways, have already been visited, and
that no new flaw in the argument could enter to
shake up the debate. I say to the reader that the
surest sign that the issue is unsettled is that my
critics disagree among themselves about the puzzle
and even the key principles under discussion: the
WCP, and in one case, the SLP itself. To remind us
[Section 2.2]:
SLP: For any two experiments E1 and E2
with different probability models f1, f2
but with the same unknown parameter θ,
if outcomes x∗ and y∗ (from E1 and E2,
resp.) determine the same likelihood func-
tion [f1(x
∗; θ) = cf2(y
∗; θ) for all θ], then
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x
∗ and y∗ should be inferentially equiva-
lent for any inference concerning parame-
ter θ.
A shorthand for the entire antecedent is that
(E1,x
∗) is an SLP pair with (E2,y
∗), or just x∗ and
y
∗ form an SLP pair (from {E1,E2}). Assuming all
the SLP stipulations, we have
SLP: If (E1,x
∗) and (E2,y
∗) form an SLP
pair, then InfrE1 [x
∗] = InfrE2 [y
∗].
Bjørnstad
According to Bjørnstad, “The starting point is
not that we have an arbitrary outcome of one sin-
gle experiment, but rather that two experiments
have been performed about the same parameter re-
sulting in proportional likelihoods.” I do not think
Bjørnstad can actually mean to say the SLP cannot
be applied until both members of the SLP pair are
observed. So, for example, if in the sequential ex-
periment one is able to stop (with a 0.05 p-value) at
n= 169, resulting in y∗, one may not regard it as ev-
identially equivalent to x∗, the SLP pair with n fixed
at 169, until and unless x∗ is actually generated?
The universal generalization of the SLP asserts that
for an arbitrary y∗, if it has an SLP pair x∗, then
y
∗ is equivalent in evidence to x∗. Bjørnstad’s prob-
lematic reading results in his next remark: “So Birn-
baum does not enlarge a known single experiment
but constructs a mixture of the two performed ex-
periments.” What is constructed in Birnbaum’s ex-
periment EB is a hypothetical or mathematical mix-
ture, based on having observed y∗ (from E2). This is
part of the key gambit I call Birnbaumization (Sec-
tion 2.4). We are to consider the possibility that per-
forming E2 (which gave rise to y
∗) was the result of
a θ-irrelevant randomizer (deciding between E1 or
E2). Now I grant Birnbaum that we may imagine all
the SLP pairs are “out there,” each pair assumed to
have resulted from a θ-irrelevant randomizer, ripe
for plucking whenever a member of an SLP pair is
observed. (See Sections 2.5 and 5.1.) Yet even grant-
ing Birnbaum all of this, we still may not infer SLP
(nor does it follow in the case where the mixture is
actual).
Bjørnstad also criticizes me because he claims the
SLP “is simply not about method evaluation.” His
position is that there is an evidential appraisal, and
quite separately an assessment of long-run perfor-
mance. For a frequentist, or one who holds Birn-
baum’s (Conf), evidential import is inseparable from
an assessment of the relevant error probabilities. Not
because we regard evidential import as all about
long-runs, but because scrutinizing a given inference
is bound up with a method’s ability to have alerted
us to misleading interpretations.
Bjørnstad does “not find any new clarification of
Birnbaum’s fundamental theorem in this paper” be-
cause he assumes I am channeling the attempts of
Durbin (1970), Kalbfleisch (1975) and Evans, Fraser
and Monette (1986), all of whom restrict or mod-
ify either SP or WCP to block the result. While
I stand on the shoulders of these and other ear-
lier treatments, a crucial difference is that, unlike
them, I do not alter the principles involved. If one
is out to demonstrate the logical flaw in an argu-
ment, as every good philosopher knows, one should
scrupulously adhere to the premises and generously
interpret the machinations of the arguer. This I do.
Bjørnstad’s opinion is that “one may regard the pa-
per by Mayo as actually not discussing the LP at
all.” Or, alternatively, one may regard the position
held by this critic to be mistaken about the SLP and
Birnbaum’s argument.
Dawid
Professors Dawid and Evans disagree about the
key principle invoked in Birnbaum’s argument, the
WCP. Dawid views it as an equivalence relation,
Evans says it is not. I follow Birnbaum in regarding
the WCP as an equivalence, but, unlike both Dawid
and Evans, I pin down what is to be meant in re-
garding WCP as an equivalence, or, for that matter,
an inequivalence (see Section 4.3). First Dawid.
Dawid maintains that my WCP differs from the
principle of conditionality Birnbaum uses in the SLP
argument. Not so. I am working with the WCP
stated in Birnbaum (1962, 1969), the very same one
defined by Dawid:
The evidential meaning of any outcome
of any mixture experiment is the same as
that of the corresponding outcome of the
corresponding component experiment, ig-
noring the over-all structure of the mix-
ture experiment.
Dawid’s definition is a portion of the one found in
Birnbaum (1962), page 271. It assumes, of course, all
of the other stipulations, for example, we are making
“informative” inferences about θ, it is a θ-irrelevant
mixture, the outcome is given, and all the rest. It
is the definition used in countless variations of the
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SLP argument, and it is clearly captured in my Sec-
tion 4.3. Perhaps I should have abbreviated it as CP;
WCP comes from Berger and Wolpert’s (1988) man-
ifesto, The Likelihood Principle. My intention was to
underscore Birnbaum’s emphasis that the WCP con-
cerns mixture experiments and is distinct from many
other uses of “conditioning” in statistics [Birnbaum
(1962), pages 282–283].
I wondered why Dawid thought I denied that
WCP asserts an equivalence, until I noticed that
Dawid lops off the end of my sentence from Sec-
tion 7: I do not say “the problem stems from mistak-
ing WCP as the equivalence” simpliciter, but rather
it stems from the incorrect equivalence! The incor-
rect equivalence equates the inference from the given
experiment with one that takes account of the (ir-
relevant) mixture structure. This is what Dawid is
on about in describing invalid construals of WCP,
so he can scarcely object. (See Section 5.2.)
As with any equivalence, there is an implicit in-
equivalence as a corollary. [See (i) and (ii) in Sec-
tion 4.3.] Typically, in saying the evidential import
of two outcomes are the same, one would not add
“and be sure to ignore any features that would ren-
der them inequivalent.” Birnbaum adds this warning
because some treatments do not ignore the mixture
structure. To put this another way, WCP includes
the phrases “is the same as” as well as “ignoring.”
The problem is that Dawid is ignoring the word “ig-
noring” in the very definition he proffers. There is
no difference between the phrases
• ignore the over-all structure of the mixture exper-
iment
and
• eschew any construal that does not ignore the
over-all structure of the mixture experiment.
I also refer to this as irrelevance (Irrel) (Sec-
tion 4.3.2) because Birnbaum describes the WCP
as asserting the “irrelevance of (component) exper-
iments not actually performed” [Birnbaum (1962),
page 271].
Dawid opines that I am using the WCP in David
Cox’s (1958) famous weighing example, which he
does not define; I am guessing he means to suggest
I must be limiting myself to actual mixtures. That
is to miss the genius of Birnbaum’s argument. Birn-
baum, quite deliberately, intends to capitalize on the
persuasiveness of conditioning in Cox’s famous ex-
ample, but his ploy is to extend the argument to
mathematical or hypothetical mixtures. (I am not
saying it is an innocuous move, but that is a separate
matter.) Even if Dawid chooses to view Cox’s WCP
as a nonequivalence, it is irrelevant; I am following
Birnbaum in construing it as an equivalence, per-
mitting, for example, y∗, known to have come from
a nonmixture, to be evidentially equivalent to the
appropriate θ-irrelevant mixture as in Section 4.3.
(Irrel) protects against illicit readings that Dawid
warns against. SLP still will not follow.
So Dawid, Birnbaum and I are using the same
definition of WCP. The onus is on Dawid to pin-
point where my characterization deviates from Birn-
baum’s. The only difference is that I have shown one
cannot get to SLP, and Dawid gives no clue how to
get around my criticism.
For Dawid to simply pronounce that “Birnbaum’s
theorem is indeed logically sound” and that there-
fore my argument “must itself be unsound” is
question-begging, and will not do. Demonstrating
unsoundness of my argument should be accom-
plished straightforwardly, as I have done regarding
Birnbaum. That said, I fully agree with Dawid that
one can view [(SP and WCP), entails SLP] as a theo-
rem, but in order to detach the SLP, as is mandatory
for Birnbaum, he is left with a “proof” that is either
unsound or question-begging. Perhaps those who are
long wedded to Birnbaum’s argument are comfort-
able with merely assuming what was to have been
shown. It is part of the mysterious “path of enlight-
enment followed by conversion” that Dawid men-
tions. That is no reason for others to allow “trust
me, it is sound” to take the place of argument.
Evans
Given that Evans largely agrees with me, it may
seem ungenerous to focus on apparent disagree-
ments, but there is too great a danger in leaving
some misimpressions regarding a problem already
beset with decades of misunderstanding. Notably, it
seems I have not convinced Evans of the logical er-
ror that Birnbaum makes. Instead Evans thinks the
problem is with the conditionality principle WCP,
and claims that frequentists need to fix it somehow.
But it is not the principle, it is the “proof.”
I have at least convinced Evans that there are
cases where SP and WCP and not-SLP hold with-
out logical contradiction (in Mayo (2010)). These
cases may be called “counterexamples” to the ar-
gument whose conclusion is the SLP. They are also
counterexamples to [WCP entails SLP], using the
weaker notion of mathematical equivalence of Birn-
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baum (1972) that dispenses with (SP). Evans will
take those counterexamples to show that WCP is
not an equivalence relation, assuming a frequentist
standpoint. Now it is true that any such counterex-
ample may be seen to warn us against mistaking
WCP as asserting the incorrect equivalence, noted
in my rejoinder to Dawid. But that does not pre-
clude WCP from asserting a correct equivalence.
A more general issue I have with Evans’ treatment is
that it does not show where the source of the prob-
lem lies in arguments for SLP. Introducing his set-
theoretic treatment into a simple argument, I am
afraid, does not help to pinpoint where the argu-
ment goes wrong, but in fact leaves us with a very
murky idea even as to his definition of WCP. The
argument for the SLP begins with: We are given
y
∗ from E2, a member of an SLP pair. Will Evans
block introduction of the mathematical mixture in
Birnbaumization? This would seem to cut off Birn-
baum’s argument too quickly. Were that sufficient,
the debate would have surely ended with Kalbfleisch
(1975). Note too, unlike Evans, my argument in the
paper under discussion does not rely on assuming a
frequentist principle at all, though obviously I avoid
a formulation that rules it out in advance. To sum up
this section, Evans uses my counterexamples to show
a restricted WCP may be applied, while blocking
SLP. Left as it is, it opens him to the criticism (the
one Dawid raised!) that he is altering Birnbaum’s
WCP and restricting it to actual mixtures.
What a surprise, then, to hear Evans allege that
“many authors, including Mayo, refer to the [WCP]
which restricts attention to ancillaries that are phys-
ically part of the sampling.” I do not know on
what grounds Evans wants to distinguish actual and
mathematical mixtures, but Birnbaum’s argument
for the SLP concerns mathematical or hypotheti-
cal mixtures. Birnbaum calls an experiment a mix-
ture “if it is mathematically equivalent” to a mix-
ture [Birnbaum (1962), page 279]. Further, Birn-
baum (1962) emphasizes that earlier proofs [that
WCP and SP imply SLP] were restricted to actual
mixtures. “But in the above proof” he is able to
get a result relevant for all classes of experiments by
using an ancillary “constructed with the hypotheti-
cal mixture” [EB ] [Birnbaum (1962), page 286]. So,
I am not sure what Evans is alleging. In one place,
Evans worries whether the WCP “resolves the prob-
lem with conditionality more generally,” but this is
a separate issue from Birnbaum’s argument. Here
the focus is on WCP solely for purposes of arriving
at the SLP.
Although there was not space to discuss this in my
paper, it is worth noting why merely blocking the
SLP with a modified WCP fails to make progress
with a further goal required of an adequate treat-
ment. Consider how, in discussing Durbin’s modi-
fied principle of conditionality, Birnbaum notes that
“Durbin’s formulation (C’), although weaker than
[WCP], is nevertheless too strong (implies too much
of the content of [SLP]) to be compatible with stan-
dard (non-Bayesian) statistical concepts and tech-
niques” [Birnbaum (1970b), page 402]. Birnbaum
(1975, page 264) raises the same problem with
Kalbfleish’s restriction to “minimal experiments” to
which Evans’ treatment is closely related. Evans
does not show his modified conditionality principle
avoids entailing “too much of the SLP.” (This re-
lates to Dawid’s point about stopping rules in his
comment.) For a frequentist account to satisfy Bir-
baum’s (Conf), all cases that allow misleading inter-
pretations with high probability should still show up
as SLP violations.
To this end, my argument shows that any viola-
tion of SLP in frequentist sampling theory necessar-
ily results in an illicit substitution in the formula-
tion of Birnbaum’s argument. To put the problem in
general terms, p= r does not follow from p= q and
q = r, if q shifts to q′ within the argument, where
q 6= q′ (fallacy of 4 terms). For specifics see Section 5.
Thus, ours is in no danger of implying “too much”
of the SLP: what was an SLP violation remains
one. Now Evans may not be concerned with retain-
ing those frequentist SLP violations, given he makes
it very clear he embraces Bayesianism, but that is
irrelevant to what an adequate treatment of Birn-
baum’s argument demands. I have seen some statis-
tics textbooks leave the details of the SLP proof to
the reader; I think it is time to give full credit to
students who found it impossible to make a valid
substitution in general. I explained why.
3. FRASER, HANNIG, MARTIN AND LIU
Let me turn to the second group of discussants. It
is an honor to be “strongly commended” by Fraser
for emphasizing the importance of “principles and
arguments of statistical inference”; and I feel my ef-
forts are worthwhile with Martin and Liu’s noting
my “demonstration resolves the controversy around
Birnbaum and LP, helping to put the statisticians’
house in order.” I entirely agree with them that the
“confusion surrounding Birnbaum’s claim has per-
haps discouraged researchers from considering ques-
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tions about the foundations of statistics,” at least
from appealing to those foundations that reject the
SLP. Let me underscore Fraser’s point that the need
for an inferential variation of (N–P) theory “reached
the mathematical statistics community rather force-
fully with Cox (1958); this had the focus on the two
measuring-instruments example and on uses of con-
ditioning that were compelling.” Cox’s (1958) exam-
ple also appears in Hannig’s discussion, and I will
borrow his simple description of the case where the
measurement but not the instrumentM is observed.
In that case, inference is based on the convex combi-
nation of the mixture components, consistent with
WCP. This allows me to succinctly put an equivo-
cation that I suspect may enter, in the case of SLP
pairs, between the irrelevance of the mixture struc-
ture, given (Ei,zi), and the irrelevance of the in-
dex i, given just the measurement. This equivoca-
tion may be behind the Birnbaum puzzle.
Fraser rightly reminds us that, “statistical infer-
ence as an alternative to (N–P) decision theory has
a long history in statistical thinking” with strong
impetus from Fisher. Still Birnbaum struggled to
articulate a N–P theory as “an inference theory”
(Birnbaum (1977)), and my view is that we had to
solve “Birnbaum’s problem” before doing so prop-
erly. Finding Birnbaum’s argument unsound opens
the door to foundations that are free from paying
obeisance to the SLP. In this spirit Martin and Liu
correctly view my paper as “an invitation for a fresh
discussion on the foundations of statistical infer-
ence.” Yet there is more than one way of proceed-
ing. Tracing out the mathematical similarities and
differences between the approaches of Fraser, Han-
ning, Martin and Liu is a task for which others are
better equipped than I. All are said to violate SLP.
It is interesting to note, as Hannig does, that
“since the mid 2000s, there has been a true resur-
rection of interest in modern modifications of fidu-
cial inference” which had long fallen into disrepute.
Fraser’s has been one of the leading voices to per-
severe with innovative developments, and his own
“confidence” idea is clearly in sync with Birnbaum.
However, the differences that emerge in this group’s
discussions should not be downplayed. Hannig says
that “the common thread for these approaches is
a definition of inferentially meaningful probability
statements about subsets of the parameter space
without the need for subjective prior information,”
and Martin and Liu suggest that error probability
accounts are appropriate only for decision proce-
dures, as distinct from their “inferential models.”
Some might view these as attempts to build a con-
cept of evidence as a kind of probabilism but without
the priors. However, in the background of these con-
temporary developments lurks a suspicion that their
SLP violations were picking up differences where
no purely inferential difference was warranted. So
long as Birnbaum’s proof stood, this suspicion made
sense.
Post-SLP, it is worth standing back and reflecting
anew on these accounts. In this respect, this founda-
tional project is just beginning because for 40 or 50
years, the questions of foundations were largely re-
stricted to accounts that obeyed, or were close to
obeying, the SLP. So, we have Birnbaum, along-
side Fisher, being catapulted onto the contemporary
foundational scene, squarely calling on us to address
the still unresolved problem: how to obtain an ac-
count of statistical inference that also controls the
probability of seriously misleading inferences. Better
yet, the two goals should mesh into one.
4. POST-SLP FOUNDATIONS
Return to where we left off in the opening section
of this rejoinder: Birnbaum (1969),
The problem-area of main concern here
may be described as that of determin-
ing precise concepts of statistical evidence
(systematically linked with mathematical
models of experiments), concepts which
are to be non-Bayesian, non-decision-
theoretic, and significantly relevant to sta-
tistical practice. [Birnbaum (1969), page
113.]
Given Neyman’s behavioral decision construal, Birn-
baum claims that “when a confidence region esti-
mate is interpreted as representing statistical evi-
dence about a parameter” [Birnbaum (1969), page
122], an investigator has necessarily adjoined a con-
cept of evidence, (Conf) that goes beyond the for-
mal theory. What is this evidential concept? The
furthest Birnbaum gets in defining (Conf) is in his
posthumous article Birnbaum (1977):
(Conf) A concept of statistical evidence
is not plausible unless it finds ‘strong evi-
dence for H2 against H1’ with small prob-
ability (α) when H1 is true, and with
much larger probability (1− β) when H2
is true. [Birnbaum (1977), page 24.]
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On the basis of (Conf), Birnbaum reinterprets sta-
tistical outputs from N–P theory as strong, weak, or
worthless statistical evidence depending on the error
probabilities of the test [Birnbaum (1977), pages 24–
26]. While this sketchy idea requires extensions in
many ways (e.g., beyond pre-data error probabilities
and beyond the two hypothesis setting), the spirit
of (Conf), that error probabilities quantify proper-
ties of methods which in turn indicate the warrant
to accord a given inference, is, I think, a valuable
shift of perspective. This is not the place to elab-
orate, except to note that my own twist on Birn-
baum’s general idea is to appraise evidential war-
rant by considering the capabilities of tests to have
detected erroneous interpretations, a concept I call
severity. That Birnbaum preferred a propensity in-
terpretation of error probabilities is not essential.
What matters is their role in picking up how features
of experimental design and modeling alter a meth-
ods’ capabilities to control “seriously misleading in-
terpretations.” Even those who embrace a version
of probabilism may find a distinct role for a severity
concept. Recall that Fisher always criticized the pre-
supposition that a single use of mathematical prob-
ability must be competent for qualifying inference
in all logical situations [Fisher (1956), page 47].
Birnbaum’s philosophy evolved from seeking con-
cepts of evidence in degree of support, belief or plau-
sibility between statements of data and hypothe-
ses to embracing (Conf) with the required control
of misleading interpretations of data. The former
view reflected the logical empiricist assumption that
there exist context-free evidential relationships—a
paradigm philosophers of statistics have been slow
to throw off. The newer (post-positivist) movements
in philosophy and history of science were just ap-
pearing in the 1970s. Birnbaum was ahead of his
time in calling for a philosophy of science relevant
to statistical practice; it is now long overdue!
“Relevant clarifications of the nature and
roles of statistical evidence in scientific re-
search may well be achieved by bringing
to bear in systematic concert the scholarly
methods of statisticians, philosophers and
historians of science, and substantive sci-
entists...” [Birnbaum (1972), page 861].
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